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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is on the one hand to analyze whether the security’s systematic risk beta 
estimates change as the infrequent trading phenomenon appears and on the other hand to provide useful 
insight on the impact of mergers and acquisitions on competition policy. The paper employs the models 
of Scholes and Williams (1977), Dimson (1979), Cohen et al. (1983a) and Maynes and Rumsey (1993) 
on a small stock exchange with thickly infrequent trading stocks. The empirical results reveal that for 
some securities the models employed by Scholes and Williams (1977) and Cohen et al. (1983a) 
improve the biasness of the Ordinary Least Squares Market Model (Maynes and Rumsey, 1993). 
Regarding competition policy issues, we argue that competitors gain while merged entities loose or at 
least do not gain from the clearness of the mergers under scrutiny. However, if we focus our attention 
on each individual merger, the results are rather controversial. 
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 1.  INTRODUCTION   
 
The intervalling-effect bias in security’s beta estimates denotes the sensitivity 
of the beta to the length of the interval return (daily, monthly or yearly). Empirically, 
estimated beta values are systematically changed as the return interval is varied if 
Independent and Identically Distributed (IID) additive assumption is violated.1 The 
seminal paper examining intervalling-effect bias is attributed to Fama (1970). 
Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) addressed the intervalling-
effect bias slightly differently and showed the bias in beta caused by infrequent 
trading phenomenon. The latter appears when some stocks do not trade daily in the 
stock exchange. In such a case, the estimated variance and co-variance of the stock 
performance is positively correlated with their trade frequency.  
The link between the security’s beta estimates and inferences for competition 
policy has also been explored in the literature. According to this link critical role plays 
the movement of securities’ residuals during the examined time interval which is 
affected by the event under scrutiny. If the event constitutes an announcement or a 
notification of a Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As), a researcher has the ability to 
inference potential anti or pro competitive effects of the scrutinized M&As. Cox and 
Portes (1998) portray a detailed clarification of the competitive outcomes for M&As 
with infrequent trading phenomenon. 
In the literature there is a vast majority of articles which deal with the above 
mentioned research areas. In particular and regarding the intervalling-effect bias in 
security’s beta estimates, Hong and Satchell (2014) examine Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) with correlated errors with exogenous factors and consider the 
evaluation of betas on current time. The authors show, inter alia, that by modelling 
the intervalling effect bias as the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process produces extremely 
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good results for short time intervals. They also show that beta estimates are 
monotonic to time interval and estimate a critical value of beta below which the latter 
is underestimated, but the bias is decreasing above this critical value which the beta is 
overestimated as the time interval increases. Milonas and Rompotis (2013) show that 
small cap Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) have greater betas than large cap ETFs, 
while Ordinary Least Square (OLS) beta of all the ETFs increases as the interval 
return is lengthened regardless of the degree of capitalization.  
The most commonly empirical models which are dealing with infrequent 
trading phenomenon are attributed to Cohen et al. (1983a) and the Market Model by 
Maynes and Rumsey (1993). Armitage and Brzeszczynski (2011) argue that OLS 
method tends to overestimate the beta coefficients than the ARCH models. Sercu, 
Vanderbroek and Vinaimont (2008) find that OLS exhibits the highest bias and lowest 
standard errors, while the model proposed by Scholes and Whilliams (1977) delivers 
the lowest bias and the highest standard errors. 
Diacogiannis and Makri (2008) examine with OLS the intervalling effect bias 
for a number of thinly traded securities on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) and 
conclude that the bias appears.2 They also compare the beta estimates which are 
derived from the Scholes and Williams (1977) and Cohen et al. (1983a) models with 
those from the market model of Maynes and Rumsey (1993) and state that there are 
no statistically significant differences between the mean beta estimates.3   
As it concerns the literature which deals with the link between the security’s 
beta estimates and the anti or pro competitive effects of M&As, Rahim and Pok 
(2013) explore the short – run wealth effects of merger and acquisitions 
announcements in Malaysia during the period from 2001 to 2009. They find positive 
market reactions for both targets and bidding firms. Fotis and Polemis (2012a) find 
mixed results by investigating the short – run effects of critical mergers in Greece the 
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last decade, while Fotis, Polemis and Zevgolis (2011) examine 13 requested 
derogations from suspension during the period 1995–2008 by applying and assessing 
the results of three different methodologies (market model, mean adjusted return 
model and market adjusted return model). They found that the average abnormal and 
cumulative returns of the requested firms are positive and statistical significant.  
Furthermore, Duso, Gugler and Yurtoglou (2010) infer that a long time window 
around the announcement merger date (25 or 50 days prior to the event) increases the 
ability to capture mergers’ ex - post profitability by using accounting data. In this 
finding also concludes the study of Mueller (1980). Bharba (2008) infers that potential 
mergers (i.e firms that subsequently receive bids), experience a statistically significant 
wealth gain estimated to 0.59% over the three day event window, while in the papers 
by Duso, Neven and Röller (2007) and Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2007) it is thoroughly 
investigated the pro competitive and anti competitive effects of mergers and 
acquisitions under the European merger control regime.4  
This paper relates to the above mentioned strands of the literature. Unlike 
other similar studies (Vazakides 2006; Diacogiannis and Makri 2008), it provides 
useful insight on the impact of M&As on competition policy by investigating four 
critical phase-II M&As cleared by the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) from 
2006 to 2011.5   
The novelty of this paper lies in the fact that a variety of issues related to the 
intervalling effect bias is thoroughly examined within a small market such as the 
ASE, while this examination is conducted during its evolution to maturity. The main 
reason for choosing the ASE as our benchmark is that it can be characterised as a 
small emerging market which during the examined period it experienced a huge fall of 
share prices and thus a considerable number of infrequent trading securities have 
emerged.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
sample selection and the research methodology. Section 3 encapsulates the main 
findings of our analysis, while section 4 concludes the paper. In the Appendix we 
present the derivation of the employed econometric models.      
 
2.  SAMPLE SELECTION AND MODEL SPECIFICATION    
The sample consists of 22 companies listed in the ASE (three merged entities 
and 19 competitors) that were active in four phase-II M&As in Greece during the 
period 2006-2011. The said M&As took place in the oil and energy markets as well as 
in the paper and food industries.6 
The sample securities exhibit a thick infrequent trading phenomenon. 
Following Barthdoly, Olson and Peare (2007) this means that they trade more than 80 
of trading days or an average of than four days per week. Moreover, a medium traded 
security trades between 40 - 80 and a thin traded security trades less than 40 days per 
year. 
We utilise the methodologies proposed by Scholes and Williams (1977), 
Dimson (1979), Cohen et al. (1983a) and the market model with simple returns7 in 
order to measure the securities’ beta systematic risk of the scrutinized sample of 
firms.8 We use the simple return approach of the market model due to the fact that the 
crucial interval which we use in order to assess the competitive effects of the M&As 
on firm’s stock value is almost unaffected by the missing days. That is, the average 
trading frequency and the number of days between transactions in the time interval are 
quite high and low respectively. Also, this approach produces unbiased estimates of 
residuals on the days calculated.9  
Following the derivation of the econometric models in Appendix and in order 
to draw some inferences about the validity of the four different methodologies 
6 
 
presented there, we use daily security returns and we calculate the mean beta for each 
firm (merged entity and competitors) evolved in every single phase-II M&A. The 
differences between the various methodologies are based on the selection of leads and 
lags and whether the values of the beta coefficients are estimated simultaneously or 
independently.  
Scholes and Williams (1977) propose the inclusion of only one lag and one 
lead, while the Dimson (1979) and Cohen et al. (1983a) methodologies are based on 
the inclusion of many leads and lags in the estimation of the market returns. Further, 
Dimson’s model calculates beta coefficient simultaneously, while in Scholes and 
Williams and Cohen et al. (1983a) models beta coefficients are estimated 
independently. To give an example, when we apply the Dimson’s model, the beta 
coefficient is estimated by aggregating the slope coefficients of the following 
regression: 
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On the contrary, the market model does not incorporate lagged and leaded 
values of market returns and utilises the OLS methodology to estimate the beta 
coefficient (see equation 1 in the Appendix). 
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1, 2X  is the mean of sample 2, 1  is the mean of population1, 2  is the mean of 
population 2, 1n  is the size of sample 1, 2n  is the size of sample 2. The t – test follows 
a t distribution with 221  nn  degrees of freedom.  
To test the hypothesis of no difference in the means of two independent 
populations, the null hypothesis is 21210 or  0:  H , against the alternative 
hypothesis that the means are not the same, that is, 21211 or  0:  H .  
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS   
 
3.1   Systematic risk estimates under thickly traded securities 
Table 1 illustrates the difference between the mean beta generated by the 
market model and the mean beta provided by employing the models of Scholes and 
Williams (1977), Dimson (1979) and Cohen et al. (1983a). The beta estimations for 
each firm are derived from the equations (1), (2), (4) and (6) in the Appendix.  
Table 1: Pooled variance t – tests of equality of means of beta estimations 
t- statistics S  = 11, WS  S  = 55, D  S  = 22, C  S  = 33, C  S  = 44, C  
Phase – II 
Merger 1 
1,06 2,06 2,42** (0,04) 2,08 2,26 
Phase – II 
Merger 2 
0,68 2,20 0,67 0,67 0,67 
Phase – II 
Merger 3 
-0,37 1,04 3,11** (0,009) 3,31** (0,006) 3,89** (0,002) 
Phase – II 
Merger 4 
2,28** (0,04) 1,83 2,45** (0,03) 2,36** (0,04) 2,51** (0,03) 
Notes:   
(**) = statistical significant at 05,0  (p – values in parenthesis)  
S : mean value of beta coefficients derived from simple return approach of market model, 11, WS : mean value of beta coefficients derived from 
Scholes and Williams (1977) model, 
55, D : mean value of beta coefficients derived from Dimson (1979) model, 22, C : mean value of beta 
coefficients derived from Cohen et al., (1983a) model with 2 leads and lags, 
33, C : mean value of beta coefficients derived from Cohen et al., 
(1983a) model with 3 leads and lags, 
44, C : mean value of beta coefficients derived from Cohen et al., (1983a) model with 4 leads and lags 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of estimated securities’ data 
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From the relevant table it is evident that the null hypothesis is rejected for 
some phase – II mergers at 05,0  level of significance (the difference between the 
mean beta estimated using the simple return approach of market model and the mean 
beta obtained using the alternative models for each security is statistically significant). 
Particularly, regarding the phase – II merger 1, the difference between the mean beta 
coefficient from the market model and the mean beta generated by the Cohen et al. 
(1983a) model with two leads and lags is statistically significant.  
Table 1 also portrays that the models proposed by Scholes and Williams 
(1977) and Cohen et al. (1983a) improve the biasness of the OLS method (market 
model) for phase – II mergers 3 & 4. Regarding phase – II mergers 1 & 2the 
difference between the mean beta coefficients estimated by using the simple return 
approach of the market model and the mean beta coefficient obtained using the 
alternative models is statistically insignificant.10 
The empirical results for phase – II mergers 3 & 4 contradict the results 
obtained by the study of Diacogiannis and Makri (2008). They state that for both low 
and mid cap securities the methods of Scholes and Williams (1977) and Cohen et al. 
(1983a) do not improve the biasness of the OLS method and conclude that the OLS 
method is appropriate for beta estimation when the infrequently traded phenomenon is 
present. 
 
3.2   Ex-post evaluation of competition policy for M&As under thickly infrequent trading 
securities   
In this section we proceed to an ex – post evaluation of the four phase – II 
mergers in order to draw some useful insights regarding competition policy. For this 
purpose and following the analysis of the previous section we utilize equation (1) in 
9 
 
the Appendix for phase – II M&As 1 & 2 and equations (3) and (7) in the Appendix 
for phase – II M&As 3 & 4. Equation (7) is estimated with four leads and lags of 
market returns.11 
Phase – II M&As 1, and 3 consist of firms that are competitors either in 
horizontal or in vertical level. The firms in phase – II M&As 2 and 4 are not direct 
competitors since they are active in neighborhood product markets. Therefore, we 
group the firms into different levels of competitive interaction so that to infer accurate 
conclusions of competition policy for M&As.  
We define various time intervals from one day prior the announcement of the 
M&A until the day of the decision of the HCC. Day 0, denotes the date of: a) the 
announcement, b) notification, c) the phase-II decision and d) the date of clearness of 
the M&A. Short – run time intervals are those that span until 20 trading days before 
and after each Day 0. Long – run time intervals are those that span from 1 trading day 
before the announcement until the trading day of the clearness of the M&A (from 52 
to 68 trading days). 
We use standard literature so as to calculate Average Abnormal Residual 
( jtAAR ), Cumulative Average Abnormal Residual ( jtCAAR ) and Cumulative 
Abnormal Residual ( jtCAR ) of security j at period t. Thus
n
AR
AAR
j
jt
jt

 , where n  is 
the number of the sample securities and jtjtjt RRAR
ˆ  are the abnormal residuals, 
where jtR  is the actual return of security j at period t and jtRˆ  is the estimated return 
derived from equations (1), (3) and (7) in the Appendix. 



n
mt
jtjt AARCAAR , where 
m  is the first day of the time interval and n  its last day and 



n
mt
jtjt ARCAR .
12 
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We estimate the econometric models over 200 trading days, starting 2 days 
prior to the various time intervals. For simple return approach of market model the 
estimation interval of the econometric models is greater than a calendar year. 
Table 2 elaborates the short – run competitive effects of the whole sample of 
M&As.  
Table 2: The competitive effects of M&As: evidence from the whole sample (%)  
Method 
Merger 
announcement 
All Firms Competitors Merged firms 
AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AAR CAAR 
S
tjR ,  
-1 +1 1,29* 1,13 1,33* 0,96 1,04 2,22* 
-5 +5 -0,36 -0,40 -0,42 -0,56 0,00 0,62* 
-10 +10 0,53* 0,07* 0,64* 0,04 -0, 16 0,20 
-15 +15 -0,20 0,49 -0,23 0,46 -0,01 0,71 
-20 +20 0,05 0,07 0,04 0,03 0,08 0,28 
WS
tjR

,  
-1 +1 0,92* 0,47 1,08* 0,53 -0,10 0,13 
-5 +5 -0,17 -0,45 -0,20 -0,63 0,05 0,71*** 
-10 +10 0,49 -0,71 0,58 -0,88 -0,11 0,41 
-15 +15 -0,11 0,27 -0,13 0,14 0,03 1,11*** 
-20 +20 0,08 -0,66 0,07 -0,92 0,11 0,95 
C
tjR ,  
-1 +1 -‡ -‡ -‡ -‡ -0,13 0,05 
-5 +5 -‡ -‡ -‡ -‡ 0,04 0,58* 
-10 +10 -‡ -‡ -‡ -‡ -0,12 0,10 
-15 +15 -‡ -‡ -‡ -‡ 0,04 0,70 
-20 +20 -‡ -‡ -‡ -‡ 0,10 0,45 
Method  
Merger 
notification AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AAR CAAR 
S
tjR ,  -1 +1 -0,41 0,23 -0,42 0,24 -0,51** -0,78*** 
WS
tjR

,  -1 +1 -0,13 0,46 -0,14 0,48 0,07** 0,27*** 
 
Phase-II 
decision AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AAR CAAR 
S
tjR ,  -1 +1 -0,79*** -0,81 -0,81*** -0,76 -0,70** -1,16* 
WS
tjR

,  
-1+1 
-0,94* -1,10 -1,09* -1,29 0,05 0,10 
 
Date of 
Clearness AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AAR CAAR 
S
tjR ,  -1 +1 0,68 0,62*** 0,48*** 0,67 -0,13 -0,13 
WS
tjR

,  -1+1 0,75** 0,95 0,55*** 1,01*** -0,55** -0,82* 
Notes:  
‡ Even though the results from the Cohen et al., (1983a) model are positive, are not applicable for the purpose of competition policy. 
The same results we get from all time intervals. 
(*) = statistical significant at 10,0 , (**) = statistical significant at 05,0 , (***) = statistical significant at 01,0 . 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of estimated securities’ data 
 
From the relevant table, it is evident that the CAAR of both the merged firms 
and their rivals around the merger announcement shows a positive trend for almost all 
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of the time intervals. This outcome constitutes an indication that investors expected 
the mergers to be profitable for the rival firms. Duso et al. (2010) have also derived 
the same outcome for a sample of large mergers in the European Union during the 
period 1990 to 2001.  
If we restrict our attention to the three days time interval around the merger 
notification (-1 +1), the CAAR continues to be positive, except for the estimated 
value of the merged entity’s CAAR, which is calculated by using the simple return 
approach of the market model. Competitors earn positive gains around the clearness 
of the examined M&As, while the merged entities loose. However, the decrease of the 
merged entities’ security value does not offset their highly significant positive gains 
during the three days interval around the announcement of the merger. The positive 
trend of firms’ residuals constitutes an indication that the market is concerned about 
their possibly anti competitive effects. 
Investigating each M&A independently the empirical results depict that phase 
II merger 1 show a negative effect at the time of its clearness on firms’ security value. 
However, it is not statistically significant.13  
Table 3: The Vertical effects of phase - II merger 1 (%)   
Method 
Merger 
announcement 
All firms (competitors) 
AAR CAAR 
S
tjR ,  -1 +1 5,96
*** 4,01 
WS
tjR

,  -1 +1 6.02
* 3.54 
C
tjR ,  -1 +1 6.24
* 3.59 
 
Merger 
notification 
AAR CAAR 
S
tjR ,  -1 +1 0,07 0,08 
WS
tjR

,  -1 +1 6.02
** 6.23 
C
tjR ,  -1 +1 6.24
** 6.45 
Notes: See Table 2 
 (*) = statistical significant at 10,0  (**) = statistical significant at 05,0  (***) = statistical significant at 
01,0  
Source: Authors’ elaboration of estimated securities’ data 
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Regarding the vertical effects of the said merger on firms’ security value we 
conclude that the merger positively affects the competitors that are active in the 
various market segments both in the short and the long – run (Table 3). This result is 
reinforced by the fact that the AAR of all the vertical competitors (except from the 
estimated value of AAR with simple return approach of market model) is statistically 
significant with a positive sign. The positive market reaction of vertical competitors 
indicates that the market is concerned about the anti competitive vertical effects of the 
merger.14 
The analysis of the conglomerate effects of phase – II merger 2 in Table 4 
shows that the examined merger increases the efficiency of the merged entity both in 
the short and the long – run. This implies a cost saving efficiencies effect or pro-
competitive effect, that is, lower prices and higher level of competition and consumer 
welfare.15 The same result has been traced to Fotis and Polemis (2012a) in the short - 
run, but is not in alignment with the result derived by Rahim and Pok (2013).   
We derive the same result when we analyse the horizontal effects of phase – II 
merger 3 during its announcement (Table 5). This result is more evident with Cohen 
et al., (1983a) model rather than with the other models under scrutiny. In the long - 
run (52 calendar days from the announcement of the merger) the results are statistical 
significant for the total sample and particularly for the competitors under scrutiny. 
The conglomerate effects of phase – II merger 4 are analysed in Table 6. The 
results from the relevant Table depict that the competitors gained from the clearness 
of the said merger. Both in the short and the long – run (68 calendar days from the 
announcement of the merger) the CARR is positive, especially the result obtained by 
the estimation of the Cohen et al., (1983a) model. Therefore, the merger under 
examination caused anti competitive effects. 
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Table 4: The Conglomerate effects of phase – II merger 2 (%)   
Method 
Merger 
announcement 
All firms Competitors Merged Firm 
AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AR CAR 
S
tjR ,  
-1 -0,50*** -0,50*** -0,92*** -0,92*** 0,34* 0,34 
0 -0,46*** -0,95*** -0,64*** -1,56*** -0,08 0,26 
+1 -0,44*** -1,39*** -0,72*** -2,28*** 0,12 0,38 
-5 +5 -0,57 -2,26* -0,76 -3,94* -0,18 1,11* 
-10 +10 1,68* -0,70 2,62* -1,43 -0,21 0,78 
-15 +15 -0,78 0,48 -1,19 -0,58 0,03 2,60* 
-20 +20 0,85 2,87 1,17 3,54 0,22 1,53 
WS
tjR

,  
-1 +1 -0,44*** -1,80*** -0,74*** -2,94*** 0,18 0,47 
-5 +5 -0,50 -4,10*** -0,72 -6,88*** -0,06 1,45*** 
-10 +10 1,65* -3,01 2,53* -5,27 -0,09 1,52** 
-15 +15 -0,91 -1,46 -1,40 -4,12 0,07 3,86*** 
-20 +20 1,23 1,17 1,69 -0,01 0,29 3,53** 
C
tjR ,  
-1 +1 -1,24*** -2,57*** -2,01*** -4,19*** 0,32*** 0,67*** 
-5 +5 -0,52 -4,26*** -0,73 -6,88*** -0,12 0,97* 
-10 +10 1,63* -3,32 2,53* -5,27 -0,15 0,58 
-15 +15 -0,93 -1,93 -1,40 -4,12 0,02 2,44** 
-20 +20 1,21 0,51 1,69 -0,02 0,24 1,58 
 
Merger 
notification 
AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AR CAR 
S
tjR ,  -1 +1 -0,05 -0,88
*** -0,31 -1,77*** 0,48*** 0,88*** 
WS
tjR

,  -1 +1 -0,44
*** -1,80*** -0,74*** -2,94*** 0,18 0,47 
C
tjR ,  -1 +1 -1,24
*** -2,57*** -2,01*** -4,19*** 0,32*** 0,67*** 
 
-1 merger 
announcement – 
merger 
notification 
AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AR CAR 
S
tjR ,  -1 +4 -0,40
*** -1,79*** -2,31** -3,19* 0,29* 0,66* 
WS
tjR

,  -1 +4 -0,87
*** -2,67*** -2,31** -3,54* 0,26* 0,73** 
C
tjR ,  -1 +4 -0,88
*** -2,72*** -2,31** -3,54* 0,23 0,56* 
 
-1 merger 
announcement – 
date of merger 
clearness 
AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AR CAR 
S
tjR ,  -1 +68 -0,91 -9,58 -1,54 -15,59 0,34 2,44 
WS
tjR

,  -1 +68 -0,75 -2,23 -1,33 -7,06 0,42 7,43
*** 
C
tjR ,  -1 +68 -0,77 -3,48 -1,34 -7,14 0,37 3,85
* 
Notes: See Table 2 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of estimated securities’ data 
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Table 5: The Horizontal effects of phase – II merger 3 (%)   
Method 
Event 
Merger 
announcement 
All firms Competitors Merged Firm 
AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AR CAR 
S
tjR ,  
-1 1,91* 1,91 1,61* 1,61 3,74* 3,74 
0 -0,48 1,44 -0,45 1,16 -0,67 3,07 
+1 1,22 2,66* 0,85 2,02 3,43* 6,50* 
-5 +5 -0,16 -0,25 -0,20 -0,42 0,05 0,73* 
-10 +10 -0,07 -0,82* -0,04 -1,00* -0,25* 0,25 
-15 +15 0,06 -0,99* 0,07 -1,25** 0,01 0,60 
-20 +20 -0,17* -1,49*** -0,20* -1,88*** 0,00 0,82 
WS
tjR

,  
-1 +1 -0,04 0,21 -0,04 0,22 -0,04 0,16 
-5 +5 -0,27 -0,32 -0,33 -0,47 0,09 0,58* 
-10 +10 0,04 -0,65 0,08 -0,79 -0,18* 0,21 
-15 +15 0,02 -0,60 0,02 -0,78 0,04 0,47 
-20 +20 -0,17 -1,07 -0,19 -1,34 0,00 0,57 
C
tjR ,  
-1 +1 -0,08* -0,10 -0,07* -0,12* -0,10 0,06 
-5 +5 0,01 -0,56*** -0,01 -0,74*** 0,12 0,56* 
-10 +10 -0,09** -1,06*** -0,08** -1,30*** -0,13 0,36 
-15 +15 0,00 -1,41*** -0,01 -1,76*** 0,07 0,64 
-20 +20 -0,08** -1,82*** -0,10*** -2,25 0,01 0,74* 
 
Merger 
notification 
AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AR CAR 
S
tjR ,  -1 +1 -1,21
* -1,66* -1,09* -1,38 -1,94*** -3,31*** 
WS
tjR

,  -1 +1 -0,24 -0,09 -0,27 -0,11 -0,06 -0,01 
C
tjR ,  -1 +1 -0,06 0,12 -0,06 0,12 -0,02 0,08 
 
-1 merger 
announcement – 
merger 
notification 
AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AR CAR 
S
tjR ,  -1 +10 0,06 0,09 0,12 -0,17 -0,30 -1,61 
WS
tjR

,  -1 +10 0,17 -0,28 0,20 -0,39 -0,01 0,37 
C
tjR ,  -1 +10 0,20
** -0,03 0,24** -0,11 0,01 0,43 
 
-1 merger 
announcement – 
date of merger 
clearness 
AAR CAAR AAR CAAR AR CAR 
S
tjR ,  -1 +52 -0,35 -1,61 -0,32 -1,83 -0,49 -0,26 
WS
tjR

,  -1 +52 -0,10 -2,47
*** -0,13 -2,83*** 0,06 -0,32 
C
tjR ,  -1 +52 -0,04 -0,90
*** -0,04 -1,09*** -0,07* 0,21 
Note: See Table 2 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of estimated securities’ data 
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Table 6: The Conglomerate effects phase - II merger 4 (%)  
Method 
Merger 
announcement 
All firms (competitors) 
AAR CAAR 
S
tjR ,  
-1 -0,44* -0,44 
0 -0,38 -0,82* 
+1 0,14 -0,67* 
-5 +5 -0,66 0,40 
-10 +10 1,16* 1,91 
-15 +15 -1,00* -3,64 
-20 +20 1,05 6,89 
WS
tjR

,  
-1 +1 0,21 0,12 
-5 +5 0,17 1,09 
-10 +10 1,10 2,51 
-15 +15 -0,91 4,61 
-20 +20 1,21 4,65 
C
tjR ,  
-1 +1 -‡ -‡ 
-5 +5 -‡ -‡ 
-10 +10 -‡ -‡ 
-15 +15 -‡ -‡ 
-20 +20 -‡ -‡ 
 
Merger 
notification 
AAR CAAR 
S
tjR ,  -1 +1 -0,09 2,39 
WS
tjR

,  -1 +1 0,34 2,72
* 
C
tjR ,  -1 +1 -‡ -‡ 
 
-1 merger 
announcement 
– merger 
notification 
AAR CAAR 
S
tjR ,  -1 +13 2,10
* 0,62 
WS
tjR

,  -1 +13 2,10
*** 1,93* 
C
tjR ,  -1 +13 -‡ -‡ 
 
-1 merger 
announcement 
– date of 
merger 
clearness 
AAR CAAR 
S
tjR ,  -1 +68 1,08 13,59
*** 
WS
tjR

,  -1 +68 1,30 3,99 
C
tjR ,  -1 +68 -‡ -‡ 
Note: See Table 2  
Source: Authors’ elaboration of estimated securities’ data 
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4. CONCLUSIONS  
This paper applies different empirical methodologies in order to measure the 
security’s systematic risk relating to the temporally corresponding market return. It 
also explores possible anti or pro competitive effects of four phase II M&As that took 
place in Greece during the period from 2006 to 2011. For this scope we apply 
different empirical models in a sample of firms listed in the ASE with thickly 
infrequent trading securities. We assess four beta evaluating models developed by 
Scholes and Williams (1977), Dimson (1979), Cohen et al. (1983a) and Maynes and 
Rumsey (1993).   
Τhe empirical results indicate that the models by Scholes and Williams (1977) 
and Cohen et al. (1983a) improve the biasness raised from the application of the OLS 
method. It is worth mentioning that, when we use the Dimson’s methodology the 
difference between the estimated betas is not statistically significant. The applied ex 
post evaluation of competition policy in the whole sample depicts that competitors 
gain while merged entities loose (or at least do not gain) from the clearness of the 
scrutinized M&As in the short - run. This result indicates decreased efficiency for the 
merged firms and enhanced profitability for the competitors.  
However, if we focus our attention on each individual phase – II M&A, the 
results are rather controversial. More specifically, phase – II merger 1 positively 
affects competitors that are active in different levels of production in the short – run 
(vertical anti competitive effects), while phase – II mergers 2 & 3 positively affect the 
level of competition in the relevant product markets both in the short and long – run 
(conglomerate and horizontal pro competitive effects correspondingly). Moreover, the 
clearness of phase – II conglomerate merger 4 decreases the level of competition in 
the relevant markets that affected by it. 
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Notes 
1. Levhari and Levy (1977) proved that the expected value of the estimated beta of aggressive stocks 
(beta greater than one) increases as the time interval increases and hence be over- estimated (a positive 
monotonicity outcome in time interval). The opposite happening for defensive stocks (Levy-Levhari 
hypothesis).  
2. For a definition of thinly traded securities see section 2.1 below. 
3. For a literature review prior to 2008 see Hong and Satchell (2014). See also Davidson and Josev 
(2005), Wang and Jones (2005), Ho and Tsay (2001) and Daves, Ehrhardt and Kunkel (2000). 
4. For a literature review prior to 2007 see Fotis et al. (2011;74). Residual analysis has also been used 
in the literature in other research areas. See for instance Gleason, Pennathur and Wiggenhorn (2014), 
Al-Sharkas and Hassan (2010) and Jiang and Leger (2010). An application of residual analysis on 
antitrust and abuse of dominant position can be found, inter alia, in Fotis (2012). Fotis (2014) explores 
the unilateral effects of M&As on competition by using UPP and GUPPI analysis. 
5. Phase – II M&As require an in depth investigation by the General Directorate for Competition of 
HCC.  
6. The data are available from the authors upon request. 
7. The simple returns approach calculates daily returns only for days for which stock prices are 
available.  
8. The three – factor model (Fama and French 1993) addresses that the time variation in betas is priced, 
but the size and book-to-market equity effects are still statistically significant. The latter is therefore 
robust after taking into account the time-variation in beta. However, due to lack of data, the estimation 
of the  three – factor model was not possible.  
9. Unlike the lumped and uniform return approach which underestimate the variance of returns and bias 
the t-statistics used to calculate the anti or pro completive effects of M&As. For both approaches as 
well as adjusted trade-to-trade return approach see Fotis and Polemis (2012a), p 186-187. 
10. Except from phase – II merger 1, where we reject 0H  derived from Cohen et al. (1983a) with two 
leads and lags. 
11. The rationale behind the use of equation (7) in the Appendix with 4 leads and lags of market returns 
is that the estimated p- values of 
44, C for phase – II mergers 3 and 4 are lower or at least equal than 
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the equivalent estimations of 
33, C  and  22, C . Also, since the estimated beta derived from 
Dimson’s model is inconsistent, we do not estimate equation (5) in the Appendix. 
12. For the calculation of standard deviation we assume normal abnormal returns. See Maynes and 
Rumsey (1993). 
13. We don’t present the empirical results since they are not statistical significant. However, they are 
available from the authors upon request.  
14. Even though the analysis is restricted to competitors, it is absolutely safe to assume that rivals’ 
reaction is strong enough to make us believe that the examined merger has caused significant anti-
competitive effects.  
15. In this paper we don’t estimate any correlation between firms’ security value and consumer 
welfare. However, the enhancement of the latter constitutes the ultimate goal of competition policy. 
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Appendix  
Derivation of econometric models 
Following Maynes and Rumsey (1993), Fotis et al. (2011) and Fotis and Polemis (2012a) the market 
model forecasts that firm j’s security simple return at time t (
S
tjR , ) is proportional to a market return. 
That is, 
jttm
SS
jt RaR   ,      (1) 
where mtR is the return on the market index for the day t and 
s the beta coefficient of simple 
return market model. 
Scholes and Williams (1977) have indicated that beta coefficients are downward biased for 
infrequently traded securities and they are upward biased for very frequently traded securities. They 
proposed a consistent estimator of beta which is given by equation (2): 
)21(
101
mt
jtjtjtWS








     (2) 
where 
1
jt , 
0
jt  and 
1
jt  are estimates of beta coefficient from the regression between the 
observed security return and market index return at 0 ,1  tt and 1t  respectively and mt  is 
the first-order serial correlation coefficient of market returns. 
Given equations (1) and (2), the market model becomes,  
jtmt
WSWS
jt RaR  

     (3) 
Dimson (1979) advocates that the return on a specific security depends on past, present and 
future returns of the market portfolio. Dimson’s beta coefficient is given in equation (4): 




L
L
jt
D

      (4) 
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where LL  ......  are lagged, contemporaneous and leading estimated values of beta 
coefficient. Substituting equation (4) into equation (1), we calculate firm j’s security return at time t 
(
D
jtR ):  
jtmt
DD
jt RaR        (5) 
The Cohen et al. (1983a) model (see also Cohen et al. (1983b), as opposed to the Scholes and 
Williams (1977) models, utilizes many leads and lags of the market portfolio’s return so as to produce 
an efficient beta coefficient. Cohen et al. (1983a) and Fowler and Rorke (1983) argue that the beta 
estimator of Dimson’s model generates inconsistent estimates. Cohen et al. (1983a) proposed a 
consistent estimator, which is given by equation (6): 
 
)1(
1 1
1 1
 
 
 

 




L L
LmtLmt
L L
LjtLjtjt
C
 
 


      (6) 
where Lmt  and Lmt  are the L – order serial correlation of market portfolio’s returns and 
LL   ,  imply lagged and leading values of L . Substituting equation (6) into equation (1), we 
calculate firm j’s security return at time t (
C
jtR ): 
jtmt
CC
jt RaR        (7) 
